Prior research has shown that trust has a positive effect on the economic welfare of nations. We investigate this result by analyzing the effect of exogenous trust on agency problems within organizations. We find that firms located in U.S. counties where trust is more prevalent use fewer and less detailed contracts. Compensation schemes have lower power. Direct monitoring is also reduced. In spite of this, firms located in high trust areas suffer less from empire building. Finally, greater community trust is associated with higher firm profitability and valuation. Overall, our results suggest that trust is an effective way of mitigating moral hazard problems.
I. Introduction
Can trust improve contracting efficiency? Perhaps starting with Putnam (1993) , the notion of social capital has emerged as a key driver of national and regional welfare. Social capital encompasses multiple dimensions such as cooperative behavior, civic norms and association within groups but has trust at its core. This explains why this feature is now seen as an important economic construct. For example, Williamson (1993) supports the notion that trust underlies virtually all economic exchanges while Fukuyama (1995) has argued that trust improves the performance of all institutions in a society, including business.
Building on this intuition, prior research has established that countries where individuals display a greater trust grow faster (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001 ). This higher growth can be explained by different mechanisms. One is transactional efficacy. For example, individuals are more likely to participate to markets (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) ), firms are more likely to get funding (Duarte, Siegel, and Young (2012)) and markets are more reactive to information (Pevzner et al. 2014) when trust is more prevalent. This strand of literature essentially shows that transactions and markets function more smoothly when there is a greater degree of trust in the environment.
A second potential channel, that we consider, is that trust facilitates the infraorganizational efficiency. Agency problems within firms are notoriously significant hindrance to corporate efficiency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . At the core of this issue lies moral hazard. The principal has less information on the agent's action than the agent herself, which gives rise to opportunistic behaviors. To mitigate this issue, two approaches have been proposed in the literature. The first one is based on increasing the alignment of interests between principals and agents. The moral hazard problem is caused by the fact that the principal is the residual claimant while the agent is paid to execute a task on behalf of the principal but is both effort and risk averse. Since the agent's effort is not directly observable, contracts are designed to compensate the agent based on outcomes. Increasing the power of the incentives induces agents to exert a greater effort but also increases the risk that is unloaded on them. Agent's risk aversion could make these contracts prohibitively expensive.
A second approach is to directly reduce the information asymmetry between parties as well as the incompleteness of contracts. For example, specific actions can be contractually prohibited in detailed contracts. Alternatively, the principal may invest in a better monitoring technology. Naturally, this approach relies on the possibility of having enough foresight to predict contingencies and on the availability of a robust monitoring technology.
A third possibility is to rely on trust to ensure that the agent will not engage in opportunistic behaviors at the expense of the principal. For example, Chami and Fullenkamp (2002) propose a formal model of agency with trust as an alternative monitoring mechanism.
The model predicts that, when trust is more prevalent, the need for monitoring is reduced and the principal increases the insurance aspect of the wage contract. However, the agent cares more about the principal and works harder. In addition, firms enjoy higher profits. Their results are consistent with the view that trust optimizes operations within firms and more generally with the view that incomplete contracts may in fact dominate complete contracts (Allen and Gale (1992) , Falk and Kosfeld (2006) ).
Our results are consistent with the view that exogenously determined trust is indeed an efficient mechanism to mitigate moral hazard within firms. Specifically, we find that firms located in U.S. counties where trust is more prevalent use compensation schemes that have lower power. More generally, they employ fewer contracts. For example, they are less likely to be subject to a covenant and, when covenants are used, they include fewer provisions. There is also less need for strong direct monitoring in firms operating in high trust environment as evidence by the lower prevalence of long term investors and of reporting manipulations and by a lower likelihood of CEO departure in case of weak firm performance.
In spite of this apparent negative effect on control, trust is also associated with less moral hazard. Firms located in areas with greater level of trust experience a lower level of capital expenditures, a smaller growth in assets and a more positive market reaction when they acquire new companies. The effect of cash holdings on firm value is also significantly greater, a sign that shareholders expect that less value will be diverted from the balance sheet (Pinkowitz et al., 2006) . Perhaps unsurprisingly given these results, greater trust is associated with higher profit margins and higher corporate valuation. This last result holds both in level and in change specifications. Our main results are robust to a host of sensitivity checks. For example, they hold when we use instrumental variable regressions and a propensity score matched sample analysis. They hold in either in a pure cross-sectional setting or in a pure time series analysis at the economy level. In fact, our results indicate that the average trust in the US Granger-causes the average efficiency of contracting.
We then consider two additional empirical issues. First, we find that that abuse of trust weakens its effect. Most specifically, firms rely less on trust to monitor executives after a peer firm has been involved in a reporting manipulation. The effect is naturally stronger in environments where trust is higher prior to the incident. As a consequence of using a less effective contracting technology (instead of trusting people), manifestations of empire building increase. Second, we examine to what extent executives specialize in high or low trust environments. To do so, we consider a sample of CEOs who change firms. We find that the trust in the environment of the firm they leave predicts the trust in the environment of the firm they join. This result is broadly consistent with Hilary and Hui (2009) who find similar results for risk aversion.
Trust is now considered to be an important characteristic that influences social capital and institutions. However, most of the work to date has been done either at the country level in the macro-economic literature or at the individual and small group level in the management literature. Our study bridges the gap between these two strands by focusing on the effect of trust at the organizational level. It complements prior work on other social dimensions such as religiosity (e.g., Hui and Hilary, 2006) .
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We discuss the prior literature and develop our hypothesis in Section II. We present our research design and data in in Section III. We discuss our main empirical results in Section IV and results from various robustness checks and additional analysis in Section V and VI. We conclude in Section VII.
II. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development.
Gambetta (1988) defines trust as the subjective probability that an individual assigns to the events of a potential counterparty performing an action that is beneficial or at least not harmful to that individual. Fehr, Fishbacher and Kosfeld (2005) describe some of its neuroeconomic foundations. Trust can come from different sources. For example, it can be induced between individuals in the context of repeated game (Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 2006) or it can also be cultivated by managers of a specific organization. Our focus here is more on exogenous sources of trust driven by the cultural make-up of the broader firm environment. We are trying to capture the notion that some groups of individuals are on average inherently more trusting than others. For example, survey indicates that Swedes are typically more trusting than Belgians. This trust is partially inherited (Algan and Cahuc, 2010) but is also affected by multiple factors such as administrative institutions (La Porta et al., 1997), ethnic diversity (Koopmans and Veit, 2014) or religious background (Daniels and von der Ruhr, 2010). Dohen et al. (2012) find that trust attitudes are strongly positively correlated between parents and children and that child attitudes are significantly related to the prevailing attitude in the region, controlling for parental attitudes.
The role of this trust in economic development has received an increasing attention in the literature and its importance has been gradually recognized. For example, Arrow (1972, p.357) wrote ''It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence. '' Zak and Knack (2001) show that both growth and investment rate increase with trust in a sample of 41 economies. These effects are economically significant. For example, an increase in trust by one standard deviation increases growth by nearly 1 percentage point. Knack and Keefer (1997) (1997) show that trust is correlated with better government efficiency or civic participation while Guiso, Sapienza and Zinagles (2004) show that it is correlated with the development of the financial system. However, trust is likely to have an effect on economic efficiency within organizations. This dimension has been mainly investigated by the management literature. For example, Dirks and Ferrin (2001, p. 451) , suggest that trust, as a psychological state, "operates in a straightforward manner. Higher levels of trust are expected to result in more positive attitudes, higher levels of cooperation and other forms of workplace behavior, and superior levels of performance." Although results of their meta-analysis are somewhat mixed, trust has been found to have a strong effect on job satisfaction and a reasonably strong effect on organizational citizenship behavior. The work in economics and finance on the effect of trust at the firm level has been more limited. Intuitively, many economists would expect trust to have a positive effect. For example, La Porta et al. (1997, p.337) claim that "trust promotes cooperation, especially in large organizations." Knack and Keefer (1997, p.1252) indicate that "written contracts are less likely to be needed, and they do not have to specify every possible contingency." In a more formal setting, Chami and Fullenkamp (2002) shows analytically that trust can be a superior alternative to the standard tools to mitigate agency problems: increased monitoring and incentive-based pay. Al-Najjar and Casadesus-Masanell (2002) show analytically that trust is necessary for the working of incomplete contracts and that there is a monotone relationship between the principal's level of trustworthiness and her expected profit. In this framework, trust reduces the agent's risk bearing and, thus, it results in larger total surplus of the relationship.
These different predictions with different degrees of formalization motivate our hypotheses. The first one is that trust is an efficient substitute for traditional costly mechanisms such as contracts and direct monitoring. Specifically, we propose the following hypotheses:
H1a: Firms located in U.S. counties where the level of trust is higher are less contract-intensive than those located in counties where trust is lower.
H1b: The principals of firms located in U.S. counties where the level of trust is higher use less direct monitoring than those located in counties where trust is lower.
If indeed trust is a superior technology to mitigate moral hazard, empire building should be reduced when trust is higher:
H2: Firms located in U.S. counties where the level of trust is higher are less subject to empire building than those located in counties where trust is lower.
Finally, if trust is beneficial to the firm, this should be reflected in profitability and incorporated into stock prices:
H3: Firms located in U.S. counties where the level of trust is higher experience higher valuation than those located in counties where trust is lower.
III. Research Design and Data

Sample
To test our predictions, we focus our study on the United States. This stands in contrast to previous work on economic growth and trust, which typically considered differences across countries at the macro-level. The main advantage to focusing on one country is that we obtain a more homogeneous sample in terms of financial and economic development, legal structure, public infrastructure, and so forth. In addition, we add a timeseries component to our analysis, whereas prior research has largely focused on crosssectional approaches. We obtain most of our data from Compustat and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. As it is customary, we delete firms from the financial and utilities sectors (a Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] code between 60 and 69 and between 40 and 49).
We measure trust from the General Society Survey (GSS). The survey asks whether people can be trusted, to which respondents answer either "can be trusted" (where we assign value of 3), "can't be trusted" (where we assign value of 1) or "depends or don't know" (where we assign value of 2). We then average across all respondents to obtain a county level measure of trust for a given year. Information on trust at the county level is available for ten years, every two years from 1992 until 2010, though not consecutively for every county. In our main tests, we follow previous studies (e.g., Alesina and LaFerrara, 2000) and linearly interpolate the data to obtain the values in the missing years. Approximating Trust linearly increases the power of our tests and gives us the opportunity to study the time-series properties of our setting but, as discussed in the following, the results also hold when we do not linearly interpolate Trust. Following the previous literature (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005; Loughran and Schultz, 2004; Pirinsky and Wang, 2006;  Hilary and Hui 2009), we define a firm's location as the location of its headquarters. As noted by Pirinsky and Wang (2006) , this approach seems ''reasonable given that corporate head-quarters are close to corporate core business activities''. We extract historical headquarter location from past 10-K filings available on Edgar. If the data is not available in Edgar, we use the value in the closest year for which the data is available. We then examine the effect of trust on firm-specific characteristics such as contractual intensity, monitoring, investment and valuation.
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our 6 dependent variables used in Tables 3 to 5 . The first two variables measure the explicit sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm performance. Delta measures the dollar change in wealth associated with a 1% change in the firm's stock price; Vega measures the dollar change in wealth associated with a 1% change in the standard deviation in the firm's return (Coles et al., 2013 Untabulated results show that the univariate correlation between the different control variables is low. We still verify below that our results are not driven by multicollinearity.
Panel B shows the univariate correlation between trust and various county-level social and economic variables (defined in Appendix 1). The correlation between trust and these variables are relatively low (ranging from -0.02 for religiosity to 0.23 for education). It is perhaps then unsurprising that our robustness checks in Section 5 show that our main results
are not driven by other state or county level social-demographic variables.
IV. Main Results
Main specifications
We extend our analysis of the univariate correlations in Table 2 by using regressions that control for multiple variables. Our main model to test our hypotheses is the following:
where i indexes firm, t indexes years, j indexes industry j and FLC is a vector of firm-level characteristics defined in Section 3. Control is a vector of firm-specific control variables.
We lag these control variables by one period to mitigate any endogeneity issues (we further address this issue in Section 5). All of our variables are truncated at the 1% level. Years FE and Ind FE are vectors of year and industry (SIC 2-digit level) indicator variables, respectively. Unless otherwise mentioned, Model (1) is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation. All of the standard errors are robust and are corrected for the clustering of observations by firm (clustering by firm and year or bootstrapping gives very similar untabulated results). We also verify that multicollinearity is not an issue.
Untabulated results indicate that the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are all below 2 for the tabulated results.
Trust, Incentives and Monitoring
Results presented in Table 3 examine our first hypothesis that trust in the firm environment reduces both contractual intensity and the degree of internal monitoring. The results are consistent with our predictions.
Specifically, we find in Columns 1 and 2 that Trust is negatively associated with the power of the compensation contract (both Delta and Vega). indicate that the return volatility is higher in high trust environment (the untabulated tstatistic is 2.14), even though Vega is reduced.
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Although our focus is largely on the monitoring of agents within the firm, we also consider debt covenants as an extension of our hypothesis. The advantage of this approach is that it is relatively easy to measure the complexity of the contracts by observing the number of conditions a firm has to comply with. Specifically, we define D(Cov) has an indicator variable if the firm uses a debt covenant, and zero otherwise. 6 NumCov represents the log of one plus the number of provisions in the debt covenants that the firm has agreed to. Firm Size along with industry and year fixed effects. All these variables are defined in the Appendix. Untabulated results indicate that Stock return is negatively associated with the probability of CEO departure (t-statistic equals -11.61) and that this effect is mitigated by the presence of high trust (the t-statistic equals 3.70). However, Ai and Norton (2003) alert us to the fact the interpretation of the interaction coefficient in a logistic regression is not straightforward. We implement their approach and report the interaction effect in Graph 1.
Most of the data points are above the bar and the few that are not are not are appearing when the predicted probability of departure is close to zero. The Ai and Norton corrected z-statistic for the untabulated interaction is 3.38. These results suggest that boards are more likely to 8 We identify CEO turnover events from Execucomp database over over the 1993 to 2010, period during which we have identified 2,340 CEO replacement. 9 We "de-mean" Stock Retrun, and Trust before creating their interaction to mitigate multicollinearity.
consider that bad returns is attributable to good decisions with bad outcome or to events outside the control of the CEO when they operate in a high trust environment;
Lastly, in an untabulated analysis, we examine if firms operating in a high trust environment manipulate their reporting to a lower degree. We consider both accrual earnings manipulations and real earnings management. We measure accrual earnings management using Kothari et al (2005) model and Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model. We measure real earnings management using Cohen and Zarowin (2010) . Untabulated statistics for Trust are negative for both accrual and real earnings management measures (ranging from -2.01 to -5.19), suggesting that firms operating in a high trust environment manipulate financial reporting to a lower degree.
Trust and Moral Hazard.
Results presented in Table 4 examine our hypothesis H2 that trust in the firm environment reduces empire building. The results are consistent with our predictions.
Specifically, we find in Column 1 that Trust is negatively associated with PPE growth. The tstatistic equals -8.41 and the economic effect is such that one standard deviation increase in trust reduces the PPE growth rate by 9.6% relative to the mean. Untabulated results indicate that Trust is also significantly negative when we consider total asset growth instead of focusing on PPE growth (the untabulated statistic is -1.99). In an untabulated analysis, we follow Biddle et al. (2009) We also find in Column 2 that there is a more positive market reaction around the announcement that the firm has made a significant investment by engaging in an M&A deal.
The t-statistic associated with Trust when CAR [-2,+2 ] is dependent variable is 4.91 and the economic effect is such that a one standard deviation increase in trust increases 5-day announcement returns by 0.4%. New, large, profitable firms tend to grow faster. Consistent with prior studies such as Masulis et al. (2007) , the market reaction to M&A announcement is more negative for large firms and for deals involving a publicly listed firms or deals not made on a cash basis (these two controls are only included in the M&A specification).
In an untabulated analysis, we consider a broader measure of moral hazard.
Pinkowitz et al. (2006) show that value of corporate cash holding is reduced when agency costs are higher. The greater ability that agents enjoy to extract private benefit reduced the amount that shareholders eventually expect to collect. If trust can effectively reduce opportunistic behaviors of agents, we expect the value of cash to be higher in a higher trust environment. Following Fama and French (1998) and Pinkowitz et al (2006), we regress firm value on change in cash holding and control variables (details of the specification are provided in Appendix 2).
We estimate the regression for high trust subsample and low trust subsample, using median trust level at year t-1 as a cut-off point. We expect the change in cash holdings to contribute less to firm value in counties with lower trust. Untabulated results are consistent with our expectations. The coefficient associated with change in cash is 0.58 (t-statistic = 6.76) in the high trust subsample but only 0.32 (t-statistic = 3.65) in the low trust subsample. 10 The difference is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Trust and Performance
Results presented in Table 5 examine our third hypothesis that trust increases the performance of the firm. The results are consistent with our predictions. Specifically, we find in Column 1 that Trust is positively associated with valuation. The t-statistic equals 6.20
and the economic effect is such that one standard deviation increase in trust increases firm valuation by 3.2% relative to the mean. Untabulated results indicate that the result holds in first difference with a t-statistic equal to 2.03. In Column 2, we extend our findings by considering the effect of Trust on Selling, Administrative and General (SGA) expenses (scaled by sales). We find a positive effect of trust on profitability with a t-statistic of -2.69.
The economic effect is such that a one standard deviation increase in Trust reduces SGA to Sales ratio by approximately 4.2%. Further, untabulated results also show a similar improvement for the cost of goods sold (COGS) to sales margin (Trust is significant at the 5% level with a t-statistic of -2.08).
V. Robustness checks
Having established a link between trust and firm behavior, we then perform different tests to evaluate the robustness of our results.
Endogeneity
One empirical concern is the possibility that our results are driven by an unspecified omitted variable that happens to be correlated with Trust. To minimize this concern, we perform several tests to further mitigate this concern.
First, Panel B of Table 2 shows that trust has relatively low correlation with other social demographic variables. Nevertheless, we further control for county-level population size, gender distribution, religiosity, education, income level and labor force participation in our baseline specifications. 11 Panel A of Table 6 shows that our main results remain robust to these additional controls. The point estimates of the coefficients remains reasonably close to the ones in our main specifications. Our standard controls are included in Table 6 but are untabulated in the interest of space. Second, to mitigate the concerns that our results might be driven by different state attractiveness to business, we include state of location and year joint fixed effects in addition to industry fixed effects to take account of cross-state timevariations in business conditions. Panel B shows that our results remain robust to these additional controls. Third, to address the concerns that our results might be confounded by omitted firm level variables, we re-estimate our regression using firm and year fixed effects.
Panel C shows that our main results continue to hold in this specification.
Apart from incorporating different fixed effects and controls, we also used instrument variable regression approach and propensity score matched sample to further establish a causal inference. We first reproduce our OLS results using an instrument variable regression (IV) approach. Aside from investigating causality, using an IV approach has two additional advantages. First, it mitigates the effect of any potential measurement errors in the level of trust (although it is not immediately obvious why this measurement error would be correlated with dependent variables). Second, an instrumental variable approach removes the 11 Our results remain robust when we further control for state-level GDP growth. We obtain state-level GDP growth from Bureau of Economic Analysis from 1997 to 2010 and re-run our regressions over this shorter sample period. Trust remains significant at a minimum of 5% level (the absolute value of the t-statistics ranges from 2.14 to 6.01). . 12 Prior to 1992, GSS survey was carried out at a smaller scale at state and sampling unit level. The mapping of sampling unit to county is not publicly available. Questions related to trust were asked in four different years in the 1970s: 1973, 1975, 1976 and 1978 . We calculate the average trust over those four years to maximize number of states for which we have estimates we can use as an instrument.
As additional robustness checks, we consider two more IV specification. Next, we re-estimate our main results using propensity score matched sample.
Specifically, propensity scores are created every year by regressing a high trust indicator variable (an indicator variable equal to one when a firm is located in high trust county, and zero otherwise) on firm level characteristics tabulated in Table 3 (i.e., firm age, size, leverage, performance, capital expenditure, return volatility and financial distress) using a probit model. 16 Untabulated t-tests indicate that the two samples are not statistically different.
Panel E of Table 6 indicates that our conclusions regarding Trust remain unaffected.
14 Ethnic diversity is calculated as one minus Herfindahl index of percentage of county population that is Black, Asian, White, Native American and Others. 15 The only exception is that the t-statistic associated with the 5-day announcement returns drops to 1.58. 16 The purpose of this approach is to find a matched firm with the same ex ante likelihood of locating in similar trust region given the set of firm characteristics. To create a matched sample, we match a firm located in a low county with the firm located in a high trust county that has the closest propensity score.
Next, we remove observations for firms that have not changed their headquarters location during our sampling period. Thus, we focus on firms that have chosen their location years before entering our sample. This deep lagged approach further mitigates endogeneity.
Untabulated results indicate that our main conclusions are unaffected (with the absolute value of the t-statistics ranging from 2.86 to 4.48).
Lastly, we remove observations coming from counties where one or two firms may have a disproportionate influence (defined as county-year which are populated by one or two firms). We do this to mitigate the risk that the behavior of the population is influenced by one or two key employers. Untabulated results indicate that our main conclusions are unaffected (with the absolute value of the t-statistics ranging from 3.11 to 8.47).
Other robustness tests
Additional pooled sample tests
The GSS Survey does not measure the trust level in every period. In our baseline test, we linearly interpolate the estimates. As a robustness test, we focus on observations for which we have a direct measurement of trust. Although our sample size is smaller by approximately 60%, our main results still hold. Panel A of Table 7 shows that both the estimates of the coefficients and the statistical significances are reasonably close to those obtained in our full sample (the magnitude of the coefficients is usually slightly larger and the statistical significance slightly lower). This suggests that our linear interpolation does not create systematic noise in the sample. Untabulated results indicate that Trust remain statistically significant (with the absolute value of the t-statistics ranging from 1.69 to 5.38).
Cross-sectional Analysis
Next, we address the concern that our observations may be clustered in a limited number of counties by estimating our main regressions at the county-year level. To do so, we calculate the average values of the different variables over the entire sample period (1992-2010) and re-run the regressions treating each county-year as one observation (the standard errors are robust and are corrected for the clustering of observations by county). Although this purely cross-sectional specification removes the temporal variations and drastically reduces the power of our tests, all of the variables remain significant at the conventional levels (as reported in in Panel C). In other words, our results are not a statistical artefact created by the large sample size.
Next, we re-estimate our regressions at the firm level in pure cross-section (using industry fixed effects). To do so, we calculate the average values of the different variables over the entire sample period and re-run the regressions treating each firm as one observation.
All of the variables have the predicted sign and all but % Ded Inv remain significant at the conventional levels (as reported in in Panel D).
Time-series Analysis
We then calculate the mean (and the median) of each variable on a yearly basis to obtain a pure time series of the different variables (i.e., we use only 18 yearly observations for this test). This further removes the concern that our results are driven by an unspecified omitted cross-sectional variable. We use a balanced panel to calculate these time series (to make sure that our results are not caused by firms entering or leaving our sample or changing location), but the results are similar to when we use an unbalanced one. The Chi-square statistics indicate that Trust Granger-causes the effect on our dependent variable. This result holds when we use the time series of either the means or the medians (the p-values range from 0.00 to 0.02). It also holds if we control for macro-economic factors (i.e., GDP growth) and market sentiment (Baker and Wrugler, 2006) . In other words, our results hold not only in panel and pure cross-section specifications, but also in pure time-series tests.
VI Additional Empirical Analysis
Betrayal of Trust
How do firm's behavior change when trust is abused by peers? We measure violation of trust by examining whether peers violate the trust granted by the community. D (affected) is an indicator variable equal to one if a peer (defined as a firm in the same SIC 2-digit industry, year and state) experiences a restatement, litigation and an AAER enforcement action and zero otherwise. We hypothesize that unethical actions committed by peers erode the benefit of trust and lead to revision in contractual design and monitoring effort. Such revision should be more evident in high trust regions than low trust regions.
To test these conjectures, we first assess the average effect of D(affected) on our main dependent variables. We find mixed results. Untabulated results indicate that affected firms are associated with a significant increase in PPE Growth and %DedInv. However, there is no significant change in Delta, Vega, Tobin's Q and market reaction to M&A announcements.
To investigate the possibility that these mixed results are due to a lack of power, we split our sample between high trust subsample (Panel A) and low trust subsample (Panel B). Results in Table 8 indicate that firms in high trust environment respond to the erosion of trust by increasing power of CEO incentive contract (higher Delta and Vega), and using stronger monitoring from shareholders (more dedicated investors), but they become less effective in preventing empire building (more PPE growth and less effective M&A). Valuation is marginally but negatively affected. In contrast, we are unable to detect any effect in the low 
Trust and CEO
Finally, we finish our empirical analysis by considering the effect of trust on CEO selection. We expect that managerial style, trust, and investment behavior should be congruent. We follow an approach similar to Hilary and Hui (2009) to explore this idea and examine a sample of 139 CEOs who changed employers from 1993 to 2010. 17 We regress the trust of the county where the new employer is located (Trust_Joining) on the trust of the county where the former employer is located (Trust_Leaving). If aversion to distrust is a stable parameter for CEOs, then we expect CEOs to operate in similar environments and predict that the two measures of trust will be positively related. We use three specifications.
The first specification regresses Trust_Joining on Trust_Leaving controlling for other difference in social-demographic variables. The second specification further controls for joining state and leaving state time-invariant characteristics through state level fixed effects.
In the third specification, we add leaving firm characteristics. Results in Table 8 indicate that the trust of the county where the former employer is located is predictor of the trust of the county where the new employer is located. This finding holds in all three specifications, with t-statistics ranging from 2.34 to 3.32. This is consistent with the observation that CEOs consistently choose to work for organizations that are likely to exhibit the same culture. The other demographic variables are mostly statistically insignificant.
Geographic Dispersion
Our results in Section 6.2 suggest that there is congruence between the firm locationbased culture and its executives, which may lead to a natural tendency toward cultural homogeneity. Nevertheless, the degree of homogeneity may still vary across organizations and the effect of culture may be stronger in more homogeneous firms. To test this intuition, we consider how the geographic dispersion of a firm's operation affects our results. To do so, we create D(Nseg>2), an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has two or more geographic segment; zero other. We then re-estimate our regressions including D(Nseg>2) and its interaction with Trust. 18 Our untabulated results are mixed. In all the regressions, the sign of the interaction is consistent with the idea that the effect of trust is reduced for geographically 18 We obtain geographic segment data from Compustat Segment Database. The mean (median) number of geographic segments for our sample is 2.78 (2) segments and the maximum number of segments is 33. dispersed firms. However, the coefficient is only statistically significant in three out of six cases (i.e., %DedInv, PPE Growth and CAR [-2,2] ).
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VII. Conclusions
We consider the possibility that trust facilitates the infra-organizational efficiency and more specifically mitigate corporate agency problems. Our results are consistent with the view that exogenously determined trust is indeed an efficient mechanism to mitigate moral hazard within firms. Specifically, we find that firms located in U.S. counties where trust is more prevalent use compensation schemes that have lower power. More generally, they employ fewer contracts. For example, they are less likely to be subject to a covenant and, when covenants are used, they include fewer provisions. There is also less need for strong direct monitoring as evidence by the presence of fewer long term investors and a lower probability of CEO departure in case of bad firm performance. In spite of this apparent negative effect on control, trust is also associated with less moral hazard. Firms located in areas with greater level of trust experience a lower level of reporting manipulation and pursue less empire building activities. More specifically, the value of cash holding is greater, the level of growth in assets or capex is lower, the ex ante likelihood of over-investment is reduced and the market reaction when they engage in M&A activity is more positive.
Perhaps unsurprisingly given these results, greater trust is associated with higher profit margins and higher corporate valuation. These results are robust to a host of robustness checks. For example, results hold when we use different instrumental variable approaches.
They hold in a pooled sample, in pure cross-section and in pure time series.
We then consider two additional empirical issues. First, we find that that abuse of trust weakens its effect. Most specifically, firms rely less on trust to monitor executive after a 19 It is marginally insignificant with a t-statistic of 1.63 when Delta is the dependent variable.
peer firm has been involved in unethical event. The effect is naturally stronger in environment in which pre-existing trust is higher prior to the incident. As a consequence of using a less effective contracting technology, manifestations of empire building increase.
Second, we examine to what extent executives specialize in high or low trust environment.
We find that, in a sample of CEOs who change firms, the trust in the environment of the firm they leave predicts the trust in the environment of the firm they join. 
Vega
Compensation Vega measures dollar change in wealth associated with a 1% change in the standard deviation of the firm's returns and is obtained from Coles et al (2013) .
% Ded Inv
Percentage of shares outstanding held by dedicated institutional investors, where classification of investors follows Bushee (1998)
PPE Growth
Change in PPE over lagged PPE CAR [-2,2] 5-day cumulative abnormal return from day -2 to day +2, where event day 0 is the date of M&A announcement. The benchmark return is calculated using Carhart (1997) four-factor model with model parameters estimate over the 200-day period from event day -210 to event day -11 Tobin Market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the sum of book value of common equity and deferred taxes, all divided by the book value of assets.
COGS/Sale
Costs of goods sold over sales D (Affected) Indicator equal to one if there is at least one firm experiencing restatement, litigation and AAER enforcement in the same state, year and 2 digit SIC industry.
Trust
Trust is constructed from General Society Survey (GSS). Survey ask the question of whether people can be trusted, to which respondents answer either "can be trusted" (where we assign value of 3), "can't be trusted" (where we assign value of 1) or "depends or don't know" (where we assign value of 2). We then average across all respondents from one county to get county level measure of trust for every year. In case where trust measure is not available in that year, we interpolate the value from the most recently available value.
Log Firmage
Log of firm age, where age is calculated as number of years since a firm first appeared in CRSP Firm Size Log of total assets Leverage Short term debt plus long term debt. All divided by total assets ROA Operating income before depreciation expense over lagged total assets Capex/AT Capital expenditure over total assets Log Vol
Log of annualized monthly standard deviation of the stock return in year t Zscore Altman Z score is calculated as 1.2*(current assets-current liabilities)/total assets+1.4*retained earnings/total assets+3.3*net income before tax and interest/total assets+0.6* market value of equity/book value of total liabilities+0.99*sales/total assets D(CEO Replace) Indicator equal to one if a CEO is replaced in year t and zero otherwise.
Stock Returns
Log of stock returns over past year
CEO Ownership
Log of percentage of outstanding stock owned by CEO.
CEO Age
Log of CEO age Where X t is the level of variable X in year t divided by the level of assets in year t; dX t is the change in the level of X from year t − 1 to year t, X t − X t−1 , divided by assets in year t; dX t+1 is the change in the level of X from year t to year t+1, X t+1 − X t , divided by assets in year t; V is the market value of the firm calculated at fiscal year-end as the sum of the market value of equity, the book value of short-term debt, and the book value of long-term debt; E is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits; A is total assets; RD is research and development (R&D) expense where NA is net assets defined as total assets minus cash and L corresponds to cash holdings. We include industry and year fixed effects in the regression and cluster all standard errors at firm level.
We estimate above regression for high trust subsample and low trust subsample, where we split the sample by median trust level at year t-1. Untabulated results indicate that the estimated coefficient (β 16 ) is 0.58 (t-statistic = 6.76) in the high trust subsample and is 0.32 (t-statistic = 3.65) in the low trust subsample. The difference is statistically significant at 5% level (p value=0.04). 
